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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GIBBONS AND REED COMPANY, a
Utah Corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No. l4030

vs.
CITY OF OGDEN, UTAH, a municipal corporation; UTAH STATE ROAD
COMMISSIONi OSCAR A. ROBIN; and
HARDY SCALES CO., a corporation,
Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT, CITY OF OGDEN, UTAH

NATURE OF THE CASE
This respondent agrees with appellant's statement
of the nature of the case.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court entered judgment in favor of all
defendants and respondents, no cause of action.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Ogden City seeks the affirmance of the trial
court's determination and judgment of no cause of action in
favor of all defendants.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts submitted by the appellant
are substantially correct but the city adopts the more com-
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plete statement of facts made in the brief of Respondents
Robin

and Hardy Scales Company with the additional statement

that the appellant filed its claim with Ogden City, on which
this action is based, on September 3, 1968. The option, on
which the suit is based, is dated September 30, 1965 and it
expired by its terms December 31, 1966.
ARGUMENT
I
THE OPTION WAS DEFECTIVE AND INCOMPLETE AND WAS,
THEREFORE, NOT A BINDING CONTRACT.
The option was drawn by the State Road Commission
(R-560).

It is to be construed against that commission in the

event of ambiguity or uncertainty.

Jensen vs. Anderson, 24 Ut.

2d 191, 468 P.2d 366, first head note reads "Option Agreement
would be strictly construed against party who drew it."
The option clearly indicates as was testified to by
the representatives of the Road Commission at the trial that
it is in effect a hunting license. Witness Shrader, page 585J>
line 14-173 testified for appellant:

"I think that a con-

tractor before he even submits a bid, I think, should find
out from the property owner if material is available or not."
It merely attempted to advise potential or successful bidders
as to where they might negotiate for and perhaps obtain fill
material.

The amount of fill to be sold, "if any", by the

City was left to future negotiations, also, the removal of
any material thereafter to be removed was at the owner's lines
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and grades.

It is obvious that a very critical element of a

contract is missing from this document, and that is the amount
of fillj if any, the City would be "willing to have removed
from this property.

Appellant's witness Shrader (R-586)

testified that under this "option11 "the property owner could
limit it to six inches or to top soil."
At the trial this interpretation was clearly shown
by the evidence presented that the property is very valuable
industrial property located at a strategic intersection of
freeways (R-759)*

It was further testified that the sanitary

sewer is available, (R-762) culinary water is available and the
property lends itself to easy and profitable industrial develop
ment in its present condition but, if it is cut down as the
plaintiff desired, its usefullness for industrial purposes
would be practically destroyed (R-.76I - 7 6 5 ) .

No reasonably

intelligent owner of this property would, under any circumstances, have allowed the removal of the material claimed by
the plaintiff.

Such removal would have left slopes on that

property to be maintained and stabilized by the owner. Those
slopes would have made about three acres of the property,
under the slopes, totally unusable.

Such land removal would

have required pumps to get the sanitary sewage into the sewer
lines at a substantial cost and inconvenience.

The access to

the land would have been up an incline which would have to be
maintained as well as using additional land for the incline
(R.76I.765).

-3-
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These potential problems needed further negotiations
by the land owner and anyone desiring to remove any soil from
this property.
In no way does the option agreement either mention.,
hint at, or in any other way allude to any amounts of materials,
let alone 500,000 cubic yards as mentioned in plaintiff's
complaint.
In Hansen v. Snell, 11 Ut. 2d 64, 354 P.2d 1070
(i960), this court held that where a real estate listing
contract stated "terms to suit the seller," seller was justified in asking for $5,000 down and $400 per month with ten
per cent interest on the unpaid balance even though those
terms prohibited the sale as a practical matter.

In a well

reasoned opinion, the court stated:
"She (.the seller) cannot be held to any other
commitment than that expressed therein: that
she would sell the property on her own terms."
P. 1072 Pac. .-.;..
In the present case, Ogden City can be held to no
other commitment than that expressed in the option; that is,
if at some future time the parties negotiate and agree that a
certain amount of materials is to be taken, and establish lines
and grades, etc. then the price will be $.03 per cubic yard.
Any agreements as to specific amounts of materials in the
option, or commitments to furnish any materials whatsoever
just aren't there.
If a contract is so indefinite that the courts can't

-4~

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

determine what is specifically contracted for, it is unenforceable.
In Valcarce v. Bitters, 12 Ut. 2d 6l, 362 P.2d
427 (1961), plaintiff sought to have a promissory note
cancelled which he had given to defendants. Plaintiff alleged
that the note was a part of a side agreement on the sale of
several mink.

Plaintiff could not delineate the sale agree-

ment with sufficient certainty to satisfy the court that the
agreement sould be enforced.

This court stated that a con-

tract requires definiteness to be enforceable.
n

A condition precedent to the enforcement of
any contract is that there be a meeting of
the minds of the parties, which must be
spelled~lrmt, either expressly or impliedly,
with sufficient definiteness to be
enforced."
:
P. 42b (Emphasis added)
~~
Even though it is evident no minds met as to amounts,
such amounts, if agreed upon, are not stated with any definiteness or at all. The plain, simple wording of the contract
clearly declares that the City of Ogden reserved the right so
to determine amounts. The contract requires future arrangements to be "made for each, or any, occupancy or removal."
And, according to the option, any materials which may be
removed "must positively be removed to the owner1s lines
and grades."

Thus, if at some future time some amount might

be agreed upon to be taken, arrangements for those amounts
would have to be made, including what amount, what lines and
what grades. From the plain wording of the agreement, it is
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evident that no minds met as to these items. The City cannot
be held liable for something for which it did not contract*
The case of Davison, et al. vs. Robbing, et al,
30 Ut. 2d 338, 517 P-2d 1026 (1973)j involves a writing
which did not describe the property to be sold.
held the contract unenforceable.

This court

It holds "Parol evidence

is admissible to apply, not to supply, a description of lands
in a contract.M
No one can say that the contract in question mentions
any amount at all, let alone with sufficient definiteness to
be enforceable.
The "optionrf did not make an enforceable agreement
between the parties, therefore, it is illusory and unenforceable.
ARGUMENT
II
THE OPTION IS UNENFORCEABLE BECAUSE IT DOES NOT
COMPLY WITH THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
This "option" does not comply with Section 25-5-3,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953^ for much the same reasons as set
forth under the previous argument.

Clearly, the statute of

frauds requires the writing to contain all the elements of
the contract.

This writing does not define the amount of

fill to be removed and it, therefore, does not comply with
the statute of frauds and it is unenforceable.
The case of Birdzell v. Utah Refining Co., 121 Ut.
412, 242 P.2d 578 (1952), was an action for damages for breach
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of an oral contract to sub-lease land.

The plaintiff used

a letter from the defendant as the memorandum in writing to
satisfy the statute of frauds. The court held the memorandum
insufficient.

The court said on page 580 of the Pacific

Reporter:
"it is fundamental that the memorandum which
is relied upon to satisfy the statute of frauds
must contain all the essential terms and
provisions of the contract
Hawaiian
Equipment Co. v. Eimco Corp., Utah, 207 P.2d
7§4. As will be noted, the letter does not
state what amount the rent shall be but
expiessly leaves that question open for
further negotiations. In an oral contract to
execute a lease for a period longer than one
year, the amount of the rent is clearly one of
the essential terms which must appeal in a
memorandum. The court in Rohan v. Proctor,
6l Cal.App. W f , 214 P. 986, 988, stated that
!t
it may be stated as settled law that a
memorandum of agreement for a lease which is
required to be in writing, in order to satisfy
the statute of frauds, must contain all the
essential and material parts of the lease which
is to be executed thereafter according to its
terms, and particularly must contain three
essentials in order to (sic) its validity under
the statute of frauds. These are: First, a
definite agreement as to the extent and boundary
of the property to be leased; second, a definite
and agreed term; and third, a definite and
agreed rental and the time and manner of its
payment.!!
The essential item left out in that writing was
the amount of the rental. In the case at bar, the essential
item left out of the "option" is the amount of material to be
removed, if any.
In Baugh v. Logan City, 495 P.2d 8l4, 27 Ut. 2d 291,
the court held there was no memorandum in writing sufficient
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c
r
i

to take the claimed agreement for the purpose of rent out of
statute of frauds.

The court cited the Birdzell case with

approval and, in that case the default was that the land to
be exchanged was not adequately described and, therefore,
the statute of frauds was not satisfied.
The appellant argues that even though this agreement
is vague and incomplete, the court should determine that it is
still a binding contract and the city is obligated to supply
the fill dirt from the land involved to the extent that a
"reasonablerr owner would supply.
with this concept.

The city totally disagrees

Land has been considered a unique item

and the option reserved to Ogden City full control of this
unique property.

That control included the right to determine

how much, if any, was to be removed and exactly the lines and
grades of that removal. For the Court to now substitute its
determination as to what is reasonable removal when the city
reserved total control is for the court to make a totally new
and different contract on behalf of the city.
In the recent case of Thomas J. Peck v, Lee Rock
Products, 515 P.2d 446, 30 Ut. 2d 187, the item which was
indefinite was the price. The applicable contract provision
read as follows:
"Added Option
"Upon mutual agreement between Clinton L. Lee
and Thomas J. Peck, Thomas J. Peck shall have
the option to buy the equipment and business
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from Clinton L. Lee for the price to be
mutually agreed upon by both parties at any
such time after business Is in complete
operation. The price shall be determined by
two competent appraisers and agreed upon by
both concerned parties - Lee and Peck.
"The payment is to be mutually agreed upon
by both partlesT*1
Certainly, a reasonable price is a much easier item for the
court to have determined than how much fill can reasonably be
removed from a piece of valuable industrial property.

In the

Peck case, the Utah Supreme Court held the option to purchase
illusory and indefinite and unenforceable.

The court did not

hold, as the plaintiff urges in this case, that the parties
intended a reasonable price which the court would undertake to
determine and make the option enforceable.
Likewise, in the Birdzell case, supra, the only
critical item left out of the memorandum was the amount of
the rental for the property involved.

Under the plaintiff!s

theory, the court in that case would have held the parties
intended a reasonable rent and would have made a determination
of what that amount would be. The court did not do that, it
held that the proposed agreement was unenforceable because
the parties had not agreed on and reduced to writing the
essential item in that case, the amount of the rent, in the
case at bar the essential item not agreed to and not reduced
to writing was the amount of fill to be removed.. This
agreement is, therefore, unenforceable as it does not comply
with the statute of frauds.
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In the event the court does interpret the contract
that the city is bound to supply the amount of material
reasonable under the circumstances, the amount authorized
would, in no event, exceed six feet average depth because
no reasonable owner would consent to destroying or to even
slightly decrease the value of this property for industrial
purposes in exchange for fill material at three cents per
cubic yard.

To determine the reasonable amount, the income

to the owner balanced against the damage to the land would
be the most critical factor to consider.

The undisputed

testimony is that the land is worth at least $10,000.00
an, acre (R-765) f o r industrial purposes. The removal of
500,000 yards would have netted the owner $15,000.00 (R-76'3)
for the material and it would have decreased the value of
the land for industrial purposes from $10,000.00 an acre
to $500.00 an acre (R-765).

The removal of an average of

six feet at the very most would have been authorized by any
reasonable owner and, as testified by Mr. Griffin, this
would have produced 198,000 yards (R-568).
Another problem arises, if the court takes the
reasonable amount theory, the damages testified to by the
plaintiff's agents would not be applicable.

That amount of

fill would have been used south of the railroad crossing and
many of the cost factors included in plaintiff's computation
would not be applicable and no damage figures could be

-10-
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determined.
The appellant puts much reliance on the discussion
between the assistant city engineer> Ray Kimball, and the
representative of Gibbons and Reed.

Interpreting this dis-

cussion most favorably to the appellant3 it does not cure the
defects in the "option11 or it does not satisfy the statute of
frauds requirement/ The validity of the option as a binding
contract or its compliance "with the statute of frauds are to
be determined by the document itself and not by parol evidence
of subsequent events. Davison v. Robbins, supra.

.

ARGUMENT
III

••

OGDEN CITY IS NOT ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING THAT THE
"OPTION" WAS TOO VAGUE AND THEREFORE UNENFORCEABLE.
The claimed estoppel seems to be based on the
discussion between Mike Gibbons and C. R. Kimball, Assistant
Engineer,

That conversation should be put into its proper

perspective.

Gibbons -was referred to Kimball by Kimball's
V

old friends at Gibbons and Reed (R-617)•

The conversation seems

to be primarily a discussion as to how much dirt would result
from various removal depths. There is no clear statement
that Mr. Kimball attempted to authorize on behalf of the city,
the removal of any dirt or to any specific depth. Kimball's
deposition states there was no attempt by him to establish
lines or grades or by anyone in the city engineering office
known to him (R-786).

It was primarily an engineering dis-

cussion, not to the question as to how much the city, landDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ownerj would allow removed.

There is no testimony that Kimball

purported or authorized the removal to any depth, Mr. Kimball
was an employee only of the engineering department, he was not
the city engineer, the public works director or the city manager.
His authority was limited to advising the city engineer (R-756)
(R-784).

These facts were known or should have been known to

Gibbons.

The dealings concerning the option were made with

Kelley as public works director and with Sam Hood as city
manager.

That alone is notice that the action of those officials

would be required as to this important item as to depth of
removal from this very expensive, valuable industrial property.
Any damages Gibbons suffered was due to their own conclusions
and desires. Appellant apparently desired to remove as much
dirt from this land as it could because its location and the
cost was very low. It made these determinations without any
consideration of the landowner's interests. As testified by
Mr. Kelley, the removal of the amount of dirt claimed would
substantially destroy this very valuable property for industrial
purposes.

It would require the installation of sanitary sewer

pumps where the land in its present condition can be served
by sanitray sewer by gravity (R-762).

Such removal would

result in steep slopes, difficult to stabilize and expensive
to maintain (R-760, 76l 762 and 764). Such removal would
require expensive, inconvenient, land consuming access roads
(R-762).

All of these factors would substantially reduce the
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value of the property for its obvious use as prime industrial
property—according to Kelley from $10,000.00 an

acre to

$500.00 an acre (R-765) . All of these facts were known or
should have been known to the appellant and rather than
assuming that it could remove as much dirt as it wanted, it
should have considered the landowners position and negotiated
with the officials of the city who had authority to act and
take into consideration these factors which would result in
only a small amount of dirt being removed from this property
so that it could still retain its very valuable use as
industrial land.

Mr. Gibbons discussed none of these items with

Mr. K i m b a l l (R-619, 6 2 1 ) .

Appellant

w a s going t o h a n d l e t h i s

valuable industrial land the same as a gravel pit with no
concern for its use for industry (R-618).
ARGUMENT
IV
THE OPTION, EVEN IF VALID, WAS NEVER EXERCISED TO
BECOME A BINDING CONTRACT TO SELL MATERIALS FROM THE LAND.
The court found and the record shows that no demand
was made for any fill to any responsible and authorized
city official. The option, even if valid, was never exercised.
There was, therefore, no breach by the city, even assuming a
valid option. Mr. Reed, for appellant, testified no demand
was made on the city (R-64-0, 61*1 and 6M-5) •
The Utah State Road Commission, in its brief, states
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that the option agreement was enforceable and that Ogden City
should respond in damages to Gibbons and Reed.

The city's

answers to this argument are set forth in Argument I and IT
of this brief, i.e. the option is illusory and unenforceable
and that it does not comply with the statute of frauds. That
being the case, the appellant does not have any claim against
any defendant, including the State Road Commission based on
that "option." If the State Road Commission has other obligations to appellant on the bidding documents, as claimed
by appellant, that does not involve the city.
ARGUMENT
V
ANY DAMAGES SUFFERED BY APPELLANT WERE NOT CAUSED
BY OGDEN CITY.
Any damages suffered by Gibbons and Reed were due
to the unreasonable and unfounded assumptions of its officers
or employees. None of those losses were caused by Ogden City.
It is amazing that such an experienced contractor and its
officers would assume that Ogden City, or any other property
owner would consent to receive $15,000.00 (which is 3^ a yard
for 500,000 cubic yards of fill (R-765)) and allow the destruction of about twenty acres of prime industrial property
which is reasonably worth $10,000.00 an acre (R-765) or a
total of $200,000.00 before the dirt removal, but approximately only $500.00 per acre (R-765) or a total of $10,000.00
after the removal. The appellant's officers should have
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assumed the landowner would reasonably protect its land and
not allow its destruction and made their assumptions accordingly.
The appellant's losses, if any, are not the city's obligation.
ARGUMENT
VI
ASSUMING THE APPELLANT'S CLAIM THERE ARE NOT FINDINGS
ON ALL ISSUES IS CORRECT, THE FINDINGS MADE DISPOSE OF THE
CASE AND FINDINGS ON OTHER ISSUES ARE UNNECESSARY.
The case is disposed of by the findings which were
made and it is purposeless and unnecessary to make findings
on the other issues. The findings support the judgment and
the judgment should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
VII
APPELLANT'S CLAIM AGAINST THE CITY WAS NOT TIMELY
FILED.
The option was dated September 31, 1965, and It
expired by its term December 31, 1966. The claim against
Ogden City was filed by the plaintiff September 3 5 1968.
The Governmental Immunity Act, Title 30 of Section 63 which
Governmental Immunity Act took effect July 1, 1966, Section

63-30-13 reads as follows:
"63-30-13. Claim against political subdivision-Time for filing notice-rClalm against city"
or town for injury on highways, bridges, or'
other structures.--A claim against a political
subdivision shall be forever barred unless notice
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thereof is filed within ninety days after
the cause of action arises; provided, however
that any claim filed against a city or incorporated town under section 10-7-77* Utah Code
Annotated, 1953•,f
That law requires the filing of the claim in this
action to be within ninety days after the cause of action arose.
When did the cause of action arise? Appellant's
briefs page 19* argues that the city repudiated the option in
May., 1966. If that is so, the cause of action arose in May of
1966 and a filing September 3* 1968, does not comply with
either the old filing law, Section 10-7-77* or the Governmental
Immunity Act.

The latest the cause of action could have arisen

is December 31, 1966, the date the "option" expires. As to
that, the ninety day filing applied and a filing September 3*
1968, is too late. The plaintiff argues that its time for
filing the claim can be extended for many months by its activities
on other property which has no relation to the one involved.
This is not a situation involving "items of account." There
is no question but that a claim under the statute could have
been filed and was required to be filed at the latest one year
after the date of breach which,, under any theory, the last
day for filing would have been in May of 1967. There is no
question but what the filing of claims statute is mandatory
and it was not complied with and; therefore,, this action
should be dismissed.

Under plaintiff's theory, a person

who suffers a personal injury can extend the time for filing
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his claim against the city or other governmental unit until
released by his doctor and each expense for a doctor's visit
extends the time for filing.
The purpose of the filing statute is to advise the
city officers of the claims so they can be timely investigated
and protect the city's interest.
The recent case of Baugh v. Logan City, M-95 P.2d
81^, 27 Ut.2d 291, involved the time for and necessity of
filing a claim for breach of contract against a city.

The

case holds that claimed damages for breach of contractual
obligations are claims which must be filed and the filing
time is ninety days after the cause of action arises.
The time begins to run in a breach of contract
action from when the breach occurs and not when the damage is
ascertained.

M.H. Walker Realty Co. v. American Surety Co.,

60 Ut. I+35, 211 P. 998.
No claim was timely filed so this action should be
dismissed as to the defendant city.
CONCLUSION
It is, therefore3 respectfully submitted that the
Judgment of the court below in favor of all defendants and
respondents of no cause of action should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

d

/

wAi i.£^ '^
Corporation Counsel
Attorney for Ogden City
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